states experimented with income taxes in 19th Century, 7 it was not until the early part of the 20th Century that states imposed income taxes with any regularity. 8 By the 20th Century, however, almost every state imposed personal income taxes. 9 The personal income tax is now a behemoth revenue generator, accounting for about a third of the revenues generated by the states.'° The federal income tax grew up roughly parallel with the state income taxation regime." The federal government collected an income tax during the Civil War, and then again enacted an income tax statute in 1894.12 Although the 1894 statute was struck down as a violation of the prohibition on "direct" taxes in Article I, Section 9, clause 4,13 the 16th Amendment permitted Congress in 1913 to enact the precursor to our modern income tax regime.' 4 Initially very few citizens were obliged to pay the income tax, which was imposed only on the extraordinarily wealthy.'
5 It was not until 2007), attributing the quote to various sources. Martin notes that Benjamin Franklin used the familiar form of the phrase, "In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes," in a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy in 1789. Id Rev. 2095 Rev. , 2098 Rev. (2000 (noting that "The Federal Income Tax has served this country well for most of the twentieth century, continuously since 1913 (since 1909 for corporate taxpayers), and with roots even earlier than 14. Klein, Bankman, & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 4-6; McNulty, supra note 12, at 2098. 15 . See Klein, Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 4-6 (noting that the exemption of up to $4,000 for married couples made the early income tax a tax on the "well-to-do"); Komhauser, supra note 12, at 873 n. 18 (noting that in 1920, only approximately 13% of the labor force paid income taxes).
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World War II and its aftermath that the federal income tax became, as it is today, "a mass tax" 1 6 or perhaps more aptly, a tax on the masses. Most of us, the masses, must file income tax returns to the United States each year. 17 Most of us also file income tax returns to our home state, that is, our state of residence or domicile. 18 At least some of us, and an increasing number of us, must also file an additional income tax return, that is to the state or states in which we earn income, if that state is not our state of residence.' 9 A state of residence can tax its residents on income those residents earn, regardless of where the income is earned. 20 Residence-based taxation is premised on the idea that residents of a state have a special relationship to their home state. 18. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 929 (noting that "41 states and the District of Columbia levy broad-based personal income taxes.") 19. Ferdinand P. Schoettle, State and Local Taxation: The Law and Policy of Multi-Jurisdictional Taxation 521 (2003) (noting that states have "begun developing apportionment rules that apply to a broader base of nonresident individuals" and that states have "increased efforts to collect taxes from nonresident individuals").
20. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-63 (1995) (noting that it is well established that "a jurisdiction, such as Oklahoma, may tax all the income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction."); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) . Although the focus of this article is on state taxation, it is worth noting that the United States taxes the worldwide income of its citizens, a practice that renders the United States "an outlier in the international community." Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443,445 (2007) .
21. It seems intuitively correct that one can be a citizen of only one state at a time. E.g., Sanford Levinson, Suffrage & Community, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 545, 554 (1989) ("We do not recognize [] dual status; thus, a citizen of Massachusetts cannot legally also be a citizen of Rhode Island (any more than, in the United States, the spouse of A can also be the legal spouse of B."). That intuition, however, has failed to convince the Court that there is any due process violation when two states claim privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government., 22 If the special relationship between a resident and her home state justifies the taxation of a resident's income, some other rationale must justify the taxation of nonresidents. Indeed, nonresident taxpayers long challenged the ability of "source states" to tax any nonresident's income. The Court finally laid the question to rest in the seminal case of Shaffer v. Carter 23 in which the Court firmly rejected the notion that states lacked taxing authority over nonresidents, calling it a "radical contention" that could be "easily answered by reference to fundamental principles. 24 One such principle is our special brand of federalism, and the concomitant autonomy and sovereignty of the several states that gives them "complete dominion over all persons, property, and business transactions within their borders., 25 The Court went on to emphasize that states have a duty to preserve and protect all persons, property and business within their borders, and the people, property and businesses within the states' borders have a corresponding duty to remit taxes for those protections. 2 6 The Court concluded with strident language, "That the state, from whose laws property and business and industry derive the protection and security without which production and gainful occupation would be impossible, is debarred from exacting a share of those gains in the authority to tax a decedent's estate as if the decedent were a resident. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, New York and Virginia both assessed estate taxes on identical income. The Court rejected a due process challenge to the assessment, holding that "Here, the thing taxed was receipt of income within Virginia by a citizen residing there. The mere fact that another state lawfully taxed funds from which the payments were made did not necessarily destroy Virginia's right to tax something done within her borders." 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938) . See also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 316-17 (1992) ("An American state is not like a nomadic tribe, with membership based on kinship .... The state ... is defined by its territory, and 'its people' are defined by the territory in which they live."); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 609 (1860) ("The position that a citizen carries with him, into every state which he may go, the legal institutions of the one in which he was born, cannot be supported."). This question of the persuasiveness of the Court's reasoning in Guaranty Trust will be reserved for another article.
22. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937 Despite the Court's firm rejection of the argument that a nonresident source state cannot tax nonresident income, there is no doubt that the nonresident state enjoys a more limited taxing authority than a resident state enjoys over its domiciliaries. Source states may tax only the income that is earned in the source state. 28 The Schaffer Court noted that a State's jurisdiction to tax nonresidents "extends only to their property owned within the State and their business, trade, or profession carried on therein, and the tax is only on such income as is derived from those sources., 29 Taxpayers have "a more narrowly defined relationship 3 0 with states in which they are not residents, and there is a correspondingly more circumscribed ability of those states to tax. Unlike states of domicile or residence, states in which taxpayers enter for a limited time do not provide the same benefits and protections to taxpayers. 3 ' The jurisdiction to tax, therefore, bears some rough relationship to the benefits provided to taxpayers. That two states are authorized to tax individual income has led to persistent taxpayer indignation about the resulting double-taxation. Historically, this concern has been mitigated by the residency state offering credits for taxes collected by the source state. 33 To illustrate, assume that a Wisconsin commuters earns the 90% of her income in Minnesota. Minnesota will tax that income because Minnesota is the source state. 34 who paid tax on the same income to another state in the same tax year qualify to claim the credit). This same practice of residence state deferring to source state is also the norm in international taxation. Kirsch, supra note 21, at 456 ("The foreign tax credit reflects an acknowledgment that the country in which income arises has the first claim on taxing that income, and that a country exercising residence-based (or citizenship-based) taxation will only collect tax on that foreign income to the extent the source country does not.").
34. 36. E.g., Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7 (noting that it is generally the credit granting state that "determines the sourcing rules that are used to determine whether the state that is purporting to tax on a source basis is taxing income that has its source in that country for tax credit purposes" which can "result in double taxation").
37. Indeed, this was the exact situation facing law professor Edward Zelinsky when New York and Connecticut both taxed the income he earned as a law professor for Benjamin N. Returning to the example set out in the introduction: Let us now assume that our commuter and her employer decide that they should capitalize on the ease and benefits of telecommuting, and the employer directs our commuter to work at least two days a week, or 40% of the time, from home. They hope that this arrangement will serve them both -allowing the employee to avoid commuting stress and be more productive, and enabling the employer to reap the benefits of the increased productivity, retain a valued employee and save on overhead. 39 Both states now have a legitimate claim to consider the income that the commuter earns while working from home to be sourced to their State. If Minnesota continues to lay claim to the income tax revenues, and Wisconsin does as well, so that so that the commuter pays income tax on approximately 126%41 of her income, is there any constitutional redress?
B. Apportionment: Taxation of Business Income
Now assume our commuter is not a commuter, but instead, a business headquartered in Wisconsin doing business nationally. If our commuter were such a multistate business, the Constitution would indeed provide protection from multiple taxation. 41 In particular, the Due Process of double taxation resulting from the overlapping claims of power to tax on the basis of residence and source, all states with broad-based personal income taxes provide a credit for taxes paid by their residents to other states." Id. This same problem of potential "double" taxation arises in the international context. In international tax "The residence country generally eliminates double taxation by either exempting the item of income from its tax base or by giving a credit against the domestic tax liability for the foreign tax." Hugh J. Clause42 requires that a state not tax income earned beyond its borders, and the Commerce Clause limits taxes to income that is "fairly apportioned" to the taxing state. 43 The Constitutional requirement of apportionment will be discussed at length in Part II, but to illustrate, assume the business earns 40% of its income in Wisconsin and the remaining 60% in Minnesota. Both states can tax some of the business income, but neither state can tax 100% of the income. 44 In fact, the states have developed relatively sophisticated apportionment formulas and schemes to tax only the income that can be "reasonably attributed" to that state. 45 When a company operates in multiple states, it can be quite difficult to decide where income is "earned" and consequently it can be difficult to determine to which state the income can be reasonably attributed. Almost all states that impose a corporate income tax use some variation of a three-factor apportionment formula in an attempt to approximate the amount of income attributable to a taxing state. 4 The factors almost universally include sales, property, and payroll, and the goal is to make a satisfactory, albeit rough, estimate of how income should be divvied up amongst the states. These three factors were chosen because each factor represents an asset commonly understood to contribute to the ability to generate income. 47 Several states have tinkered with the weight given to each factor, a common maneuver is to double-weight the sales factor, 48 but in broad strokes, there is consensus on how to apportion the income of multistate businesses. Importantly, there is no dispute that apportionment is required.
C. What's Good Enough for Business Income ought to be Good Enough for Individual Income
The states have apportioned corporate income for years, but fail to apply those well-settled apportionment rules apply to taxation of individual income. 49 The resistance to application of the apportionment schemes probably has several bases, but a prime suspect is that because relatively few individuals earn their income in a state that is not their home state, the states have not had to address apportionment. 50 Even when an individual does cross 46. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 440 (noting that the threefactor test is the most widely used formula).
47. See, e.g., Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined, 46 VA. L. Rev. 1257 Rev. , 1261 Rev. -62 (1960 ("On the basis of a trial and error process, the so-called Massachusetts formula evolved as the most common general apportionment method. The three factors of sales, payroll, and property were selected as representative income producing elements.").
48. Rev. 975, 984 (1997) (arguing that international tax policy should move away from source-based taxation given the difficulty of "associating items of income and expense with a particular geographic location").
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Tax My Ride residence tax it all? Or should the states do in individual taxation what they do in the corporate income tax realm -determine some rough way to apportion the income to the state in which it was more properly considered earned?
PART II -CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS -IN THE BEGINNING
Two constitutional norms help in the inquiry set out above. The first is the dormant Commerce Clause, and the second is the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This Part will explore the historic purpose of each of these clauses, tracing commonalities among the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses. Those commonalities, and their import for telecommuting taxpayers, are then explored in depth in Part III.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Taxation
The Founder's Intent: The Historic Purpose of the Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause is the notion that even in the absence of Congressional action, the States may not discriminate against or burden the flow of interstate commerce. 54 Economic protectionism by the states during the time of the Articles of Confederation 5 was a key concern of the drafters of the Constitution. Gellman, eds., 1996) ("[t]he centrifugal, contentious economic interests rising among the states" at the time "dampened ... postwar enthusiasm and reoriented public and private views toward the Nationalists," who warned that "discrimination against the commerce of neighboring states weakened the economies of all states.")).
56. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949) ("The necessity of centralized regulation of commerce among the states was so obvious and so fully recognized that the few words of the Commerce Clause were little illuminated by debate."). See also Denning, supra note 55, at 49.
The inability of the Continental Congress to harmonize the commercial policies of the several states, and its failure to convince states to part with that much of their sovereignty as would permit Congress to regulate commerce and raise revenue of its own, convinced many fence-sitters that the problem lay with the Articles of Confederation and encouraged moderate
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State policies, including "[d]ifferent state taxation policies" were of especial concern as those policies "weakened the economies of all states." 57 For example, New York and Massachusetts, states with major ports, "took advantage of their superior position in international commerce and in regional markets to pass discriminatory duties against neighboring states' traffic at their ports, while weaker states tried to divert trade to themselves by abolishing duties altogether, thus setting parameters for intense interstate rivalries by mid-1785. 58 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison addressed the economic protectionism problem in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 7, discussing possible conflicts between the states, Hamilton noted that,
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each state, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself.
59
Hamilton also foresaw the troubles that would arise in areas where people of neighboring states participated in multi-state markets. For example, New York relied on revenue from laying duties on imports arriving through its ports. New York's practice resulted in residents of New Jersey and Connecticut also paying higher prices for goods, but without the benefit of the duty revenue accumulating in their states' coffers. 60 Hamilton thus asked, "Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? ' 6 1 James Madison also referenced the detrimental effect of economic competition between the states on the stability of the union. He was concerned not only about the harm to national unity that this would cause, but also the inefficiency of such a practice, noting that "the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. 63 The economic conflict among the states was so alarming to many that it has been cited as "the immediate cause that led to the forming of a [constitutional] convention." 64 Granting the commerce power to Congress in the Constitution was a means of providing the national government with the power to prevent the states from harming national unity and the national economy through economic protectionism. 65 The Commerce Clause "embodied a grant of authority to Congress that created the conditions for the free movement of people, transport of products and capital, and uniform institutions that, together, proved crucial to establishing a national market., 66 In the absence of congressional legislation regarding an area of commerce, the Supreme Court enforces the anti-economic protectionism purpose behind the Commerce Clause by striking down state discrimination against interstate commerce through the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. 67 When analyzing state action that impacts interstate commerce, avoiding "economic Balkanization" has become one of the "central purposes of [ 
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The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Taxation: Complete Auto Transit Test
When a business engages in economic activity in more than one state, each of those states will be interested in taxing the business's income. Naturally, the business will want to avoid taxation in the new state if possible, and the home state will want to maintain its tax base. "Conflict between the states' interest in exercising their essential taxing power and the nation's interest in fostering economic unity has been an enduring feature of our federal system., 69 The Supreme Court noted in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota that the issue of state taxation of interstate commerce was so contentious that by 1959 the Court had issued over 300 opinions addressing Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes. 7°O ver 
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Before setting forth the 4-part test, it is useful to outline the Court's journey to that point. Initially, the Court reasoned that any tax on interstate commerce constituted a regulation on that commerce, and such regulations were entirely barred due to Congress's power to regulate the privilege of doing interstate business.
7 3 This was the "wholly immune" era of the 1870s.
74
By the 1930s, the Court had progressed to holding that interstate commerce can be made to "pay its way," but would still strike down any tax which had even a possibility of imposing a multiple tax burden on the taxpayer. 75 After allowing states to begin taxing the income of interstate businesses, the Court had trouble reaching a clear standard to determine whether states were requiring businesses to do more than just pay their way. The Court's reasoning reached a point where it elevated form over substance, disallowing taxes that were directly imposed on interstate business, but not on indirectly imposed taxes. 76 After three decades of cases in which the outcome often turned on the label the state gave the taX, 77 the Court articulated its four-factor test in Complete Auto Transit to determine whether a state's tax on corporate income imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 78 The four factors considered are (1) Nexus: the tax must be applied to an activity that has a substantial nexus with the state; (2) Apportionment: the tax must be fairly apportioned to activities carried on by the taxpayer in the state; (3) Discrimination: the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) 
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Each state in which the taxpayer does business has an interest in taxing some of the taxpayer's income, but only to the extent that the taxpayer receives benefits from the state. 80 The Court's test recognizes that when a taxpayer does business in more than one state, a perfect outcome would be for the taxing states to apportion the income such that the taxpayer would be subject to tax on 100% of its income, no more and no less. This way interstate business taxpayers are treated the same way as businesses operating in only one state -they are both taxable on all of their income, but no more than that.
Application of the Complete Auto Transit Test
A state seeking to impose an income tax on a business engaged in interstate commerce may tax only an apportioned amount of the business's income; the apportionment scheme must be intended to reflect the business activity conducted in the state.
8 ' This apportionment requirement is a critical prong of the Complete Auto Transit test. When apportioning corporate income, the most commonly used method is the so-called "Massachusetts formula," which includes the three factors of property, payroll, and sales. 82 States can and do choose other methods of apportionment, such as the singlefactor sales test and a three-factor test with a double-weighted sales factor. 83 When analyzing a state apportionment formula, the Court considers whether the formula shows "internal consistency." 84 Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by every other State consistency shows as a matter of law that a State is attempting to take more than its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction.
It is possible for two states to have apportionment formulas which conflict, resulting in double taxation, but which are both internally consistent.
The Court also asks whether a tax is "externally consistent." That is, the tax must be "fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing state." 86 Unlike the tidy thought experiment required by the internal consistency test, external consistency looks to "the economic justification for the State's claim upon the value taxed" with the goal of discovering "whether a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State." 87 The external consistency test is therefore a practical check on taxes that could pass the internal consistency test, but would nonetheless impermissibly burden commerce.
B. The Privileges and Immunities of Taxation
The Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV
Like the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution 88 prohibits states from discriminating against non-residents. 89 
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Commerce Clause, a goal motivating this additional anti-discrimination provision was "to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States." 90 Although the Clause arguably has multiple purposes, it is "first and foremost a national unity provision, eliminating a source of interstate divisiveness.' 91 As expressed by Chief Justice Taney, the Clause seeks to ensure the avoidance of "discord and mutual irritation" among the states. 92 Taxesespecially taxes one State attempts to export to another State's residentshistorically have been, and continue to be, a prime area for states to provoke each other to such discord and irritation. 
Tax My Ride
fisc by imposing taxes on outsiders is known as tax exporting. 94 In an early case, the Court addressed States' attempts to ease the tax burden on their own residents by imposing entry taxes on non-residents. 95 The majority struck down the tax as violating the Commerce Clause. 96 Chief Justice Taney, in dissent, set forth his opinion that no State may impose a tax for entering its "territories or harbours" because such a tax "is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens of other States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain., 97 In other words, such a tax violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause as well as the Commerce Clause. Although the Chief Justice was in dissent, his opinion "set the groundwork for a right to travel. As the Court more recently put it, the Privileges and Immunities Clause "places citizens of each State upon same footing with citizens of other states, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned."
99 One such advantage of citizenship is "the right of a citizen of any State to remove to and carry on business in another [State] without being subjected in property or person to taxes more onerous than the citizens of the later State are subjected to." 100 The Court recognizes that taxing authority is fundamental to state sovereignty and as such the Court has noted that its "review of tax classifications has generally been concomitantly narrow." 1 0 1 However, when state tax authority pushes up against "an activity granted special constitutional recognition" that deference to state taxing authority yields so that the Court may "protect the competing constitutional value.
1°2
94. Daniel Shaviro, An Economic & Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 908 (1992) (defining tax exportation as occurring "when governments succeed in placing tax burdens on outsiders."); see also Hellerstein, Some Reflections, supra note 22, at 1333 (striving to find the "constitutional line [that] must be drawn in a manner that allows the state to exercise its taxing power freely but not so freely that it is allowed to care for its own at the expense of others. 
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Despite its anti-discrimination promise, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause does not bar all disparate treatment of citizens and noncitizens." 3 In particular, the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not bar all disparate taxation treatment of citizens and non-citizens.°4 "[I]nequalities that result not from hostile discrimination, but occasionally and incidentally in the application of a [tax] system that is not arbitrary in its classification, are not sufficient to defeat the law."' 5 If a non-resident demonstrates a taxing scheme results in something less than "substantial equality of treatment"' 0 6 for resident and nonresident taxpayers, it is up to the State to articulate a "reasonable ground" for the difference.' 0 7 States may defend challenged actions by demonstrating a substantial reason for the difference, and showing that the discrimination bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective.'"°W ith relative frequency, the high court has held that a state has not sufficiently articulated a reasonable ground for the different treatment of non-residents, and has held a particular tax or fee violates the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. 1 0 9 In a paradigmatic case, Toomer v.
103. See Lunding, 522 U.S. at 298 ("The Privileges and Immunities Clause bars 'discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it."') (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396)). Note that in this way, the Clause differs from the Dormant Commerce Clause; under current Supreme Court doctrine, any tax that discriminates against interstate commerce is per se invalid. But see Laycock, supra note 22, at 259 (arguing that the "Court should be reluctant to imply exceptions to any of these [ Witsell," 10 the Court invalidated South Carolina's shrimping license fee that charged non-residents one-hundred times more than South Carolina residents for the privilege of shrimping in South Carolina's coastal waters."' The license fee cases demonstrate clear examples of prohibited state action. They also illustrate, however, a critical limitation on the scope of the interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause. That limit is that only certain "fundamental" rights -those rights "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity" are protected.12 The Court has consistently held that pursuit of a common calling is a fundamental right." 3
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment
While the Court has discussed the interstate, or Article IV, Privileges and Immunities Clause in numerous tax cases, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment has not figured prominently in tax cases. ) ("Certainly, the pursuit of a common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause."). While shrimping for a livelihood qualifies as a "fundamental" privilege or immunity, hunting big game for sport does not. The high court made this latter point express when it upheld Montana's licensing scheme that charged resident elk-hunters significantly lower fees than non-resident elk-hunters. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) . See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1504 (2007) (questioning why national unity is less threatened by discrimination surrounding recreation than commercial activities; noting that the distinction between the shrimp and elk cases "reveals the commercial flavor of the Court's view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it leaves unexplained why resentment and retaliation outside the commercial context is less threatening to the nation's well-being.").
114. Indeed, the 14th Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause has not figured prominently in any subject of the Court's jurisprudence. William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 153, 207 (2002) (lamenting that "The current generation of lawyers and judges has been trained to ignore the Privileges or Immunities Clause.").
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This later Privileges or Immunities Clause instructs that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."" ' 5 For over 100 years, the Privileges or Immunities clause of the 14th Amendment was "all but read ... out of the Constitution" by the Slaughter-House Cases.
1 6 In 1999, however, the Court reinvigorated the Clause, holding that the clause protects the right to travel." 7 In particular, the Court held that the 14th Amendment prohibits States from impeding "the free interstate passage of citizens" ' Tax My Ride such rights relevant here include the right to commute; or as it was phrased in the early 19th Century in a discussion of the IV Amendment, the "right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise...,,122 and the right to be free of discriminatory taxation, or, again, as phrased in the landmark 123 [Vol. 8:8
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PART HI -CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AS COMPLEMENTARY
Part III begins with an exploration of the perils of double taxation, and proceeds to demonstrate that the dormant Commerce Clause, which is said to protect "markets and market participants, not taxpayers as such"' 137 does in fact protect the "market" for employees, and therefore should provide solace to interstate commuters and teleworkers. This Part also synthesizes the goals of the Privileges and Immunities Clause with those of the dormant Commerce Clause, and demonstrates that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not occupy the field to the exclusion of the dormant Commerce Clause. Even if the dormant Commerce Clause did not apply to interstate commuters, both the 14th Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause were, and continue to be, concerned with national unity and true national citizenship. Retaliatory and protectionist taxing regimes undermine the interest in national unity, and therefore are constitutionally prohibited.
A. The Perils of Double Taxation
Double taxation doubtless seems unfair to an individual taxpayer, but its impact on the overall economy is even more pernicious. Fairness in itself is a basic building block of a good taxing system. 38 Fairness is admittedly a hazy concept, but for the purposes of this article, a straightforward characterization borrowed from scholar Linda Beale will suffice: a fair tax system is one in which "taxpayers ... believe that they will not be required to pay too much tax in comparison to other taxpayers.' 39 Fairness is important for its own sake, but fairness and the perception of fairness are also critical when tax systems rely significantly on voluntary 
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Florida Tax Review compliance, as ours do. 140 Compliance is more likely when taxpayers believe that the system is fair.
141
To the extent that a taxing system requires interstate commuters to pay more than similarly situated intra-state commuters, the double-taxation is perceived to be, and is, unfair. This perception of unfairness chips away at the taxpaying public's faith in the tax system. This is a serious critique given the current "tax gap."'
142
The fairness problem is illustrated by analogy to the taxation faced by professional athletes. After the Chicago Bulls defeated the L.A. Lakers in the 1991 NBA Finals, California got even by enacting the first "jock tax."' 143 When a professional athlete plays an away game, the city and/or state where the game is played will tax the athlete's income earned that day, claiming it is sourced in that jurisdiction.1 44 The tax is most commonly calculated using a ratio of "duty days," where the number of days the athlete is required to be in the taxing city/state for team duties is divided by the total number of days in the year the athlete is required to perform team duties. 1 4 While many of these taxes apply to all people entering a state to work and earn income, professional athletes and entertainers are the most common targets of this tax because their schedules are public and announced in advance, giving tax administrators easy access to the information they need to assess the tax. 46 The targeting of athletes based on their high salaries 140. E.g., Id. (noting that "most people aren't cheating" on their federal income taxes, and reporting that experts estimate "that the U.S. is easily within the upper tier of worldwide compliance rates").
141. Beale, supra note 138, at 371. 142. E.g., Dubner & Levitt, supra note 139, at 26 (discussing in general terms the federal income tax "tax gap"). The "tax gap" is not a uniquely American problem. See Eric J. Lyman, Vatican Officials Say Papal Encyclical Will Condemn Tax Evasion, Tax Havens, BNA Daily Tax Report, No. 158, Aug. 16, 2007 at I-1 (reporting that Pope Benedict XVI has equated tax evasion to stealing and will release "an encyclical that will condemn tax evasion as 'socially unjust;' and further reporting that "statements from the Vatican... can have an impact on the behavior of individuals or companies and on policy in poor and predominantly Catholic countries in Latin American, Africa, and parts of Asia.").
143 and public work schedules strikes some as unfair, especially considering that other highly paid individuals have an easier time flying under the radar.' 47 In addition, it is not just the highly paid athletes who bear the burden of this tax -it is also assessed against trainers, coaches, and lower-paid athletes who all travel with the team as well. 148 Athletes end up paying large sums of money to accountants to help file all of their additional state income tax returns. 49 Even those who are opposed to the ever-increasing salaries paid to athletes could agree that imposing taxes on people merely because they are easy to track is not fair. In addition, using the tax system as a tool in this way merely serves to drive the targets of the tax to find more ways to insulate themselves from state taxation.
150
The taxation of professional athletes has attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention, but commuters with less exciting jobs are similarly impacted. The question of the fairness of taxing, or over-taxing commuters, has been brought into stark relief in two recent cases in which New York's highest court held against two non-resident taxpayers -one, a law professor, and the other an information technology professional.' 5 '
In the first case, law professor Edward Zelinsky challenged New York's ability to tax as "source" income monies he earned while working at his home in Connecticut. Cardozo Law School -the institution for which Zelinsky taught -is located in New York.
152 Zelinsky performed many of his duties, however, at his home in Connecticut. 53 Zelinsky commuted three days each week during the semester, and when school was not in session and and in general can enforce tax laws against this population with far more ease than other professionals who earn salaries from activities carried on in nonresident states.").
147. See Heath and Crenshaw, supra note 144 (quoting David K. Hoffmann, an economist with the Tax Foundation, as saying "'It's not fair [that] just because this particular occupation is so easy [to track] and no one feels bad fore [sic] the rich players that they have to pay these taxes."). But see VanderKnyff, supra note 143 (noting that states are becoming more aggressive in trying to tax CEOs and -lawyers by auditing company travel records). An aggressive state revenue department could easily target trial lawyers, whose appearances in court are matters of public record. Although perhaps not as lucrative as taxing professional athletes, a trial team in a month-long, complex civil trial could easily bill in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. during his sabbatical leave in the fall semester of 1995, he worked exclusively at home. 54 Zelinsky argued that New York should be permitted to tax as source income only the percentage of income he earned while he was physically in New York.'" Similarly, Thomas Huckaby, a resident of Tennessee, worked primarily from his Tennessee home for a New York employer. 156 Mr. Huckaby presents perhaps a more compelling case, because his time in New York was even more limited than that of Professor Zelinsky -Mr. Huckaby spent only 59 days in New York in the first tax year at issue, and only 62 days in New York in the second tax year at issue. 157 Another factor making Huckaby arguably more sympathetic is that a daily commute for Huckaby would not have been just inconvenient -it simply would not have been possible. When Zelinsky prepared his tax returns, he "apportioned to New York the percentage of his total salary that reflected the number of days he commuted to the law school."' 58 Similarly, when Huckaby filed his returns, he "allocated his income between New York and Tennessee based on the number of days he worked in each state relative to the total number of days he worked in each tax year."' 59 The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance disagreed with both Zelinsky's and Huckaby's returns, and assessed deficiencies upon audit. 160 In separate cases, both teleworkers challenged the deficiencies. Zelinsky raised Commerce and Due Process Clause challenges to the assessment;' 16 Huckaby did not raise the Commerce Clause argument, but challenged the assessments on Due Process grounds. 162 The New York Court rejected both appeals, and upheld the assessments. 163 The propriety of the Court's decision will be discussed below,' 64 what is remarkable here, however, is the criticism these decisions received in both academic and 154. Id 166 In a short opinion piece published in the New York Times, the cases were criticized as unfair, and the author concluded, "The country needs telework to help address the health, energy, transportation and homeland security challenges before us, and New York's thirst for nonresident revenue simply can't take priority.'0 67
In addition to the fairness problem, discriminatory taxation of commuters has the potential to impact the flow of capital, impair commerce, and alter or impair individual travel and work habits. Although all taxes have some effects on individual behavior, 168 discriminatory taxes can create deadweight social losses. As Daniel Shaviro explains, "When [taxes] cause a taxpayer to substitute an activity for the one she would otherwise prefer in order to reduce her tax liability, they create a deadweight social loss in the amount of the reduced pretax benefit to the taxpayer by reason of the substitution." , available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov /final-report/TaxReformCh3.pdf (explaining efficiency costs as follows: "When taxpayers change their behavior to minimize their tax liability, they often make inefficient choices that they would not make in the absence of tax considerations. These tax-motivated behaviors divert resources from their most productive use and reduce the productive capacity of our economy.").
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"waste economic resources, reduce productivity, and, ultimately lower living standards for all. 17°D espite all the drags that double-taxation puts on our national economy, states remain sorely tempted to export taxes and generate revenues from non-residents. States often give in to that temptation, after all, the demands on states' fiscs continue to grow, and non-residents who earn substantial revenue in the state present what must appear to legislators and revenue authorities as a bull's eye target as they drive across the state line to come to work.'
7 ' This problem of tax exportation promises to continually become worse as our economy becomes ever more integrated. 1 72 Non-residents, of course, are also non-voters, and as such, have a much more difficult time finding relief in the state legislature. 73 Nonresidents historically have also faced a difficult time finding relief in the Congress. 174 Although a recent bill, The Telecommuting Tax Fairness Act, has been introduced in both the House and Senate, 172. Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 902 ("Today's more integrated national economy presents far greater opportunities than existed in 1787 for states in effect to reach across their borders and tax nonconsenting nonbeneficiaries.")
173. E.g., Metzger, supra note 113, at 1484 (noting "It seems fair to expect that states will downplay harms to out-of-state interests for in-state gain, at least when out-of-state interests lack effective in-state surrogates.").
174. See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 897. But see Kaye, supra note 124, at 54, 66-67 (noting a "historic reluctance of Congress to intervene in state taxation" but also noting that "in the last decade, there has been an increase in interference with state tax systems"). Commentators dispute whether Congress would adequately protect state interests in this realm. Tracy A. Kaye, for example, argues that "Congress is causing more harm than good in the name of avoiding tax discrimination and should exercise the legislative restraint it historically had shown to the taxing powers of the states. 177 Another respected scholar, Edward Zelinsky argues, on the other hand, that it is time to restore politics to the dormant Commerce Clause and "scrap the dormant Commerce Clause prohibition on discriminatory taxation."' 178 Zelinsky suggests that taxpayers with complaints about discriminatory taxation take those complaints to "Congress or to the legislature imposing those taxes. 179 Regardless of whether Congress would adequately protect states' interests, or the interests of individual commuters, nonresidents challenging state taxes have had little success in Congress. Similarly, nonresident taxpayers have had relatively little success in their complaints to state courts or in the United States Supreme Court. Nonresidents face potentially hostile state courts -courts with at least some incentive to protect the treasury on which their paychecks are drawn. Nonresident taxpayers might avoid the risk of parochial state courts by bringing suit in federal court, however, litigants must clear several hurdles to successfully maintain a suit in federal court. This is no easy task. First, the taxpayer must surmount the Tax Injunction Act, 180 the federal statute prohibiting federal courts from enjoining the collection of state taxes unless there is no adequate state court remedy. The Tax Injunction Act has been interpreted "liberally to impose a strict bar on federal court jurisdiction to entertain challenges to state taxes, except in the rare situation where the plaintiff can demonstrate that it has no adequate 176. See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 897 (noting that "for two hundred years Congress has almost never used these [Commerce Clause] powers to constrain state and local discretion in the tax area").
177. Kaye, supra note 124, at 70-71. Kaye marshals the legislation that Congress has been willing to pass, including the State Taxation of Pension Income Act of 1995 (preventing states from taxing certain retirement income of former residents) and the Intemet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) (preventing certain sales taxes on internet access and on some internet purchases) to conclude that "Congress does not represent the states and there is increasing temptation to enact legislation that benefits a select constituency at a revenue cost to the states." Id. at 70. 
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82
Even if a taxpayer has standing, another challenge taxpayer litigants face is the perception, if not the reality, that the Supreme Court is more deferential to states when states are exercising their taxing authority than in other instances of challenges to state power. 183 One explanation for that deference is that the Supreme Court "regards the power to tax as at the heart of a government's sovereignty.' ' 1 8 4 Indeed, a sovereign's "authority to impose taxes is one of its most pervasive and fundamental powers."' 85 Even if the taxpayer finds a friendly state court, or can maintain an action in federal court, yet another intensely practical hurdle exists -money. The costs of bringing litigation to challenge a tax collection will frequently outweigh the potential reward for an individual taxpayer. 183. See Shaviro, Federalism in Taxation, supra note 94, at 942 (discussing this perception).
184. Id. Shaviro continues, "Another explanation is that the Court simply lacks confidence in its ability to understand tax cases and resolve them intelligently, and thus prefers to let most challenged tax cases stand." Id. This second explanation is less persuasive. Although the Supreme Court might lack confidence to tackle highly technical federal income taxation questions, it is unlikely that the Court lacks confidence in its ability to discern questions of constitutional law, and it is questions of constitutional law that many state and local tax disputes raise. 
B. Constitutional Norms and Commuting
With the perils of double-taxation fir-mly in mind, the article now turns to a more specific exploration of how the Constitution protects our national economy from double-taxation. This part explains why the Commerce Clause 8 7 applies to this question, and then turns to the Constitutional overlap of the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses.
The Interstate Market for Employees
It is somewhat awkward to consider commuters -people -as articles of commerce. Nonetheless, it is "settled beyond question" that individuals are indeed articles of commerce, at least for dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 1 88 Perhaps it is less unseemly to think about the Commerce Clause as protecting the market in which states compete for residents£ or the market in which employers compete for employees. The dormant Commerce Clause trigger is flipped regardless of whether we consider the teleworkers articles of commerce themselves or we consider the market for those workers the triggering event. In any case, given the clear impact on interstate commerce, there is no persuasive reason that the Complete Auto Transit test should not apply to individual personal income taxation just as it applies to taxation of business income. The historic purpose of the clause dictates that it applies to suit, would discourage individual legal actions."). Note, too, that "in the absence of a waiver of immunity, the taxpayer cannot ordinarily recover interest on an unconstitutional levy. 190 Rather than pre-empting application of the dormant Commerce Clause to our commuter's complaint, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of both Article IV and the 14th Amendment complement, and provides an independent constitutional means for relief for our commuter.
Historic Purposes and Modern Commuters
Over 200 years after Alexander Hamilton and James Madison expressed their concerns about economic competition between the states, the national economy has not (yet) been destroyed by state rivalries. 91 As states fund increasingly expensive and expansive services, however, they must turn more and more to increasing taxes to generate revenue. 192 As the pressure to raise revenue grows, states compete with each other to try to attract more business and more high-income-earning residents. 193 This competition not only implicates Hamilton and Madison's concerns about harm to national unity, but also can leave interstate commercial actors, including teleworkers, fending off attempts by states to tax more than a fair share of their income.
By 197 The Court has also long recognized that individual activity can affect interstate commerce when looked at in the aggregate. 1 98 It does not matter that the imposition on commuters impacts only a portion of the stream of interstate commerce: "The imposition of a differential burden on any part of the stream of commerce -from wholesaler to retailer to consumer -is invalid, because a burden placed at any point will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state 
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Court held that a Maine property tax exemption for charitable organizations which excluded charities operated principally for the benefit of non-residents violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 2 00 The Court rejected the town's argument that campers were not "articles of commerce," and invoked the dormant Commerce Clause, noting that campers' travel to attend the camps "necessarily generates the transportation of persons across state lines that has long been recognized as a form of 'commerce."' 20 ' Rejecting the notion that economic protectionism includes only state attempts to provide advantages to in-state merchants, the Court noted that it also may include attempts to provide advantages to in-state consumers. 2°2 The Court reiterated that "a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State. '20 3 Finding the Maine property tax exemption to be facially discriminatory, 2°4 the Court strictly scrutinized, and subsequently struck down, the exemption statute. 20 ' A few campers choosing to camp in one state or another might appear trivial, and not a threat to the national economy. But the Court reminds us that the facts must be considered in the aggregate, and in the aggregate, there is no doubt that summer campers impact commerce. 20 6 Camps Newfound illustrates how the Zelinsky court erred. 20 7 The Zelinsky Court supports its conclusion by suggesting that because it is a personal decision to live in Connecticut, and work in New York, the Commerce Clause is not implicated. 2 8 This conclusion misses the point. Just as the camper's choice, most likely for personal reasons, to cross state lines in Camps Newfound triggered dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of a tax, so too does the crossing of state lines by commuters like Zelinsky. The impact of commuters on the national economy cannot be denied. As one leading Federal Income Tax text puts it, "[t]he mobility of labor is an important and necessary part of the nation's economy, since it reduces unemployment and increases productive capacity. 2°9 The Zelinsky court referred to commuting as a "personal choice" of the taxpayer.
2 10 No doubt personal preference plays a role in where to live and to some extent where to work. Indeed, the federal tax code considers commuting to be a "personal" expense, and does not allow deductions for commuting. 211 At first blush, the federal treatment of commuting expenses as personal might provide fodder for the conclusion that interstate commuting does not trigger the Commerce Clause. The lack of a federal deduction for commuting expenses, however, has been criticized as disingenuous. As one casebook puts it, "If it is a 'personal' decision to decide where to live, it is equally a 'business' decision to decide where to work., 212 In fact, the goal of neatly separating expenses into business (and therefore deductible) and personal (and therefore not deductible) is subject to cogent criticism. Furthermore, the decision to deny a personal income tax deduction for commuting expenses is efficient: whether a person chooses a long commute or a short commute, her tax liability will not change as a result of her decision, and thus tax considerations should not impact her choice. Double At the same time, as the Neuman article points out, the federal government has recently made it a priority to discourage people from driving. The tax-break for parking, coupled with the new Department of Transportation grants to discourage driving is described as a "perverse" example of government policies working at cross-purposes. Id.
212. Klein, Bankman, & Shaviro, supra note 12, at 445. 213. E.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-Related Child-Care Expenditures, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 307, 388-93 (1998) (arguing that the "business/personal distinction does not produce predictable and widely accepted results" and further observing that "the difficulty of distinguishing business and personal expenditures is far more complex than merely a problem of determining taxpayer intent. The problem with the distinction is that it marks business expenses as productive, and personal expenses as unproductive in a way that misapprehends productivity in the home and nonproductivity in the marketplace.").
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Florida Tax Review taxation of nonresident commuters, however, is inefficient. If a person faces double taxation as a result of his decision to live in one state and work in another, his tax liability will be affected by his choice, and tax considerations almost certainly will impact his decision of whether to maintain this arrangement. Rather than making his choices of where to live and work free of tax considerations, his decision will now be impacted by the knowledge that he could avoid double taxation by moving to the state of employment or finding a new job in the state of residence.
Taxpaying commuters challenging discriminatory taxation could find an unlikely ally in Justice Scalia, elsewhere a vehement opponent of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. Scalia's dissent in Camps Newfound makes clear that he is willing to apply the doctrine to overrule state taxes that facially discriminate against interstate commerce. 2 14 Particularly, Scalia quoted Justice Jackson's statement in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond that the "vision of the Founders" was "that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation .... 25 While Scalia argued against the applicability of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine to the Maine tax in Camps Newfound, the tax in the case was not truly an economic protectionist measure in the way that aggressive taxation of interstate commuters is protectionist, and thus his opposition to the use of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in that situation is unlikely to carry over to a commuter tax apportionment situation. Scalia thought that the Maine statute was best viewed as "a narrow exemption for organizations that provided services the state might otherwise provide., 216 He did not think that providing a tax break to an organization that relieved the state of providing 217 social services was something that implicates interstate commerce.
The concept that the Commerce Clause protects the right of every farmer and craftsman to have free access to every market in the nation is not just an anachronism; the concept is commonplace in judicial decisions today. The Eighth Circuit decided Jones v. Gale in 2006, holding that a Nebraska constitutional amendment prohibiting corporations or syndicates from acquiring interests in Nebraska real estate used for farming or ranching (with certain exceptions) violated the dormant Commerce Clause by favoring Nebraska residents and people who were in close enough proximity to Nebraska farms and ranches to make a daily commute. 21 
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Tax My Ride particularly noted the advertisements that had run during the ballot initiative to adopt the constitutional provision, which encouraged people to vote for it in order to "send a message to those rich out-of-state corporations., 2 1 9 The court did not find any of the state's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for adopting the provision to outweigh the harm done by denying non-residents access to the Nebraska farm market. 220 The Jones v. Gale decision explicitly applies the Commerce Clause to interstate commuters. As commuting across state lines becomes a more common work arrangement, states are unsurprisingly able to take advantage of the situation to reap more than may be fair from non-resident employees. The world of work has changed since the time of the drafting of the Constitution. 221 People are able to live in one state and work in a place much farther away than would have been possible years ago. 222 As cities and states compete to attract workers to strengthen their economies, 22 3 they also face the increasing ability of workers to separate the choice of where to live from the choice of where to work. 224 By placing a greater tax burden on people who work in their state but not live there, states with many commuter employees are able to provide themselves with some protection in the market for residents, as well as the market for workers, 22 
